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Abstract 
The diffusion of the use of various forms of impact assessments (IAs) in 
different political settings and legal traditions illustrates the great malleability 
of the tool. This diversity is not only reflected in the adoption of different 
models of IA across the various jurisdictions examined, but also in the way 
this practice is effectively implemented. Factors explaining the various types 
of IA implemented in various European jurisdictions include the patterns of 
diffusion from one country to another, the interaction of politics with expert 
knowledge and the prevailing “evidence eco-system” in each jurisdiction. In 
this study we explore diffusion patterns, not only in terms of the adoption of 
the tool of IA, but also in terms of the specific types of IA implemented. We do 
so by introducing a taxonomy developed with the purpose to describe the 
interaction of politics and expertise in each jurisdiction. The last part of the 
chapter empirically connects the diffusion process with the type of IA 
prevalent in a jurisdiction. 
Keywords: Impact assessment, Diffusion, Comparative, Governance, 
Europe, Administration  
JEL Classification: E60, E61, H70, H77, K20 
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The Diffusion of Impact Assessment Practices in Europe 
 
Ioannis Lianos1, Mihály Fazekas2, Maksim Karliuk3 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The diffusion of the use of various forms of impact assessments (IAs) in 
different political settings and legal traditions illustrates its great malleability 
and the operation of various factors. The adoption and effective 
implementation of IAs in Europe is nevertheless characterized by a great 
degree of variability among jurisdictions, despite the considerable influence 
exercised by the OECD and the EU across the European Continent (e.g. 
Radaelli, 2005; Turnpenny, Nilsson, Russel, Jordan, Hertin, Nykvist, 2008; De 
Fransesco, 2012).  
 
This diversity is not only reflected in the adoption of different models of IA 
across the various jurisdictions examined, but also in the way this practice is 
effectively implemented. IA usage varies of course within each jurisdiction 
through time and often depends on the specific policy area in which it is 
intervening (e.g. environment, health, social policy, competition) (Dunlop, 
Maggetti, Radaelli, Russel, 2012). There might also be some dissonance 
between the intended use of IA, as this is proclaimed in the foundational texts, 
guidelines, legislation, constitutional (or other) provisions that have put it in 
place in each jurisdiction, and its day-to-day use in the policy-making process. 
. Previous research has established that there are different IA “types in 
Europe4.  
  
Factors explaining the various types of IA implemented in various European 
jurisdictions include the patterns of diffusion from one country to another, the 
interaction of politics with expert knowledge and the prevailing “evidence eco-
system” in each jurisdiction (Lianos & Fazekas, 2013)5. We illustrate this 
phenomenon by exploring diffusion patterns not only in terms of the adoption 
of IA, but also in terms of the adoption of IA types. We do so by introducing a 
taxonomy developed with the purpose to describe the interaction of politics 
and expertise in each jurisdiction (Lianos & Fazekas, 2013). The last part of 
the chapter connects the diffusion process with the type of IA prevalent in a 
jurisdiction.  
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Empirically, we draw on a unique database of over 2000 IAs produced across 
Europe in 2006 Q1 – 2012 Q2 developed by the Gutenberg project at the 
Ecole Nationale d’Administration and at the Centre for Law, Economics and 
Society at University College London. 
 
2. Impact Assessment Diffusion 
 
2.1. Adoption and implementation 
 
Diffusion consists of: (1) adoption, and (2) implementation (Adelle and 
Weiland, 2012; see also De Francesco in this volume). Adoption refers to the 
formal introduction of the IA into the legal system. Implementation may be 
conceptualized as referring to the stages after the decisional point of adoption 
or more generally to the “depth of adoption” (De Francesco, 2010; and this 
volume), in essence through direct practical experience with IA indicated, 
among others, by the frequency of its use, the scope of impacts covered, the 
quality of assessment, its role in the policy-making process and eventually its 
institutionalisation, the latter concept referring to its “permanence within an 
organisation, enduring through elections and changes in government” (De 
Francesco, 2010, p. 169). The process of implementation of the IA system 
into a specific organizational and institutional context is prolonged and has 
several phases (De Francesco, Radaelli & Troeger, 2012). It should not be 
excluded that the transplantation of IA in political and legal systems that do 
not present functional equivalents to the system where the transplant 
originated may produce completely different outcomes, leading to situations of 
diffusion without convergence (Radaelli, 2005). 
 
2.2. Patterns of diffusion: a typology 
 
Diffusion may be vertical, horizontal, or both. Vertical diffusion operates 
through higher levels of governance, for example through the influence of 
international organisations or the federal level, when exploring intra-state 
processes of diffusion. The most important of the former are probably the 
OECD and the EU. Horizontal diffusion involves interconnectedness of 
governments when elites communicate and interact, exchanging ideas, 
solutions, and experiences (De Francesco, 2012). 
 
There are also different patterns of diffusion:  
 learning resulting from internal (e.g. the characteristics of public 
administration, legal and constitutional frameworks, administrative 
culture) or external (e.g. transnational institutional linkages, 
government decisional interdependence, epistemic communities) 
sources (De Francesco, 2010); 
 externalities, providing incentives altering the cost-benefit ratios of 
domestic actors, such as competition among governments for 
“regulatory quality” (leading them to adopt and implement policy 
innovations), coercion (when the diffusion of the specific policy 
innovation results from the use of material or economic power, 
including asymmetric bargaining imposing conditionality for these 
4 
 
reforms, or binding legal norms adopted by supranational institutions), 
and contractualization (when diffusion results from some form of 
symmetric bargaining between states, or “soft” international 
organization influence) (Morin & Gold, 2013); 
 socialisation among networks of experts and/or administrative elites 
(De Francesco, 2010) leading to “the internalization of shared beliefs 
due to the interaction of actors” (Heinze, 2011: 12); 
 emulation indicating the “desire (or need) of domestic actors to conform 
to interbationally widespread norms” in order to “increase the 
legitimacy of policy choices” (Heinze, 2011: 12). 
 
Some recent studies have focused on the micro-foundations of trans-
border policy diffusion, advancing the importance of the electorate in 
pushing for the adoption of “successful” policy innovations developed 
elsewhere (the voter information model) (Linos, 2013). These patterns of 
diffusion alter the material incentives domestic actors face, for example 
through the mechanisms of conditionality and competition, and through the 
mechanisms of learning and emulation, in some cases various diffusion 
mechanisms working in parallel. 
 
2.3. Patterns of diffusion in the European continent 
 
Research on diffusion of policy innovations in the EU (and also OECD) 
Member States has shown that the decision to adopt IA depends on a number 
of factors, including the presence of transnational networks, government 
expenditure and legal origin (Francesco, 2012). The overall results show the 
important contribution of transnational networks in the diffusion of 
administrative innovations. The “mediative” role of the OECD (De Fransesco, 
2012, pp. 1296-1297), perceived as a forum to facilitate discussion among 
experts for the best policy solutions, was found to have played a prevalent 
role in the adoption of IA procedures in various OECD Member States, thus 
illustrating the vertical dimension of diffusion, in particular through processes 
of socialization and emulation.  
 
The EU has also operated as an agent of diffusion, the process being 
channelled by the high-level Mandelkern Group Report on Better Regulation, 
which recommended to introduce Regulatory Impact Assessment as an 
integral part of the policy making process not only at the EU but also at the 
Member States level.6 Member States were advised to “carry out impact 
assessments where they use the right of initiative for new legislation”, to 
“submit an impact analysis of draft national rules that they notify to the 
Commission” and “to define standards for consultation and impact 
assessment for the transposition of those Directives that leave them broader 
margins for implementation”, one of the principal aims of the Commission 
being to improve the quality of national transposing measures (European 
Commission, Communication on Impact Assessment, 2002).  
                                                 
6
 The need for action at the member state’s level was stressed during the preparatory work 
for the Commission’s 2001 White Paper on European Governance stating that “action at 
Community level alone – and a fortiori by the Commission alone – is certain not to succeed” 
(Renda, 2006). 
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The Commission recognised that to be fully efficient, EU IA practices need to 
be complemented, “where necessary, by equivalent practices in the Member 
States” (European Commission, 2004a). Developing its better regulation 
agenda, the Commission recommended Member States to establish national 
“better regulation” strategies, in particular, IA systems, and encouraged them 
to aim for a scope of coverage similar to that of the Commission’s integrated 
impact assessment system (European Commission, 2005a).  
 
As a result of this process of diffusion, the declared objectives and 
motivations for introduction of IAs are usually similar across EU Member 
States. They primarily focus on improving the quality of regulations (EU, 
Denmark, France, Poland, UK), reducing administrative burden on business 
(Netherlands, Denmark), making policies more transparent (Italy), and 
combinations thereof (see more in European Parliament, 2011, p. 44, 45). 
However, looking to the micro-foundations of diffusion, the incentives 
domestic actors face for introducing IA may differ in each circumstance. For 
instance, Croatia had to introduce impact assessment of proposed new 
policies and legislation in order to receive the Programmatic Adjustment Loan 
by the World Bank (World Bank, 2005). A recommendation of the OECD 
about improvements in regulation played an important role in the adoption of 
the IA tool in Czech Republic (Vítek, 2010). In Estonia, the better regulation 
agenda and the adoption of a IA system resulted from OECD and EU 
initiatives (Kasemets, 2012) that led the Ministry of Justice to create a special 
IA working group with the task to draft IA guidelines making use of the 
European Social Fund (Justiitsministeerium, 2007; 2008a; 2008b; 2009a; 
2009b). 
 
Of particular interest is the vertical process of diffusion by the OECD and the 
EU in non-EU Member States. The tools for the vertical diffusion of IA, at the 
OECD, include technical assistance, reports, and training. The EU disposes 
additional tools and, arguably, more leverage, primarily through its practice of 
conditionality with regard to third countries (non-EU Member States). EU 
conditionality is exercised via the tools of annual progress reports, 
recommendations, conclusions, opinions, enlargement strategies, association 
agendas, action plans, etc. Furthermore, the process of integration of third 
countries into the EU trade system provides the latter a unique leverage over 
their domestic developments, leading to what some have called “the Brussels 
effect” (Bradford, 2012), thus providing an illustration of the coercive pattern of 
diffusion.  
 
The principle of conditionality has played a central role in the promotion of 
policy and administrative reforms in Central and Eastern Europe (De Ridder & 
Kochenov, 2011) the last two decades and now in the Western Balkans and 
beyond. The EU conditionality consists basically in the development of 
institutional links and the provision of financial and technical aid, as well as, 
crucially, access to the EU internal market and/or accession to the EU, 
conditional upon compliance with its various legal, policy and institutional 
requirements (be it democratic principles, acquis, etc.) (Maresceau, 2001 p. 
18). Two types of conditionality may be distinguished: 1) pre-accession 
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conditionality; and 2) market access conditionality. The first is applicable to 
countries that are in the process of accession to the EU (and which have a 
candidate or potential candidate status); the second, for countries which are 
not (yet) likely to accede to the EU. Such conditionality, if rightly applied, may 
have a spill over effect by leading to the adoption and implementation of IA 
systems covering all domestic legislation and regulation. One may, however, 
question the permanence of the implementation of IA in these instances of 
vertical diffusion, in particular as following eventual accession to the EU, the 
conditionality incentive loses its clout. This is a topic for further research. 
 
These practices illustrate that the EU’s intervention has expanded on issues 
that do not fall within the narrow scope of the “acquis” and may even be 
considered to lay outside its core competences when dealings with the current 
Member States (De Ridder and Kochenov, 2011). The task of preparing the 
accession of new Member States to the EU was interpreted very broadly, 
leading to a wider reach of the conditionality principle: not a single aspect of 
the functioning of the candidate countries was to be regarded as immune from 
EU’s scrutiny (Kochenov, 2005). As long as IA became part of the EU reform 
agenda, it was added to the EU’s outreach to third countries. This has not 
been the case (at least to the same degree) prior to the accession of the 
Central and Eastern European countries to the EU. This is understandable as 
there was no well-developed IA system in the EU at the time.  
 
Candidate countries7 and potential candidate jurisdictions8 approximate their 
legislation to that of the EU (Lazowski, 2002). The European Commission 
constantly monitors the reform and approximation progress of these 
jurisdictions using the tools of annual progress reports, recommendations, 
conclusions, opinions, enlargement strategies, association agendas, action 
plans, etc. Part of this monitoring covers the adoption and implementation of 
IA systems, ensuring their quality and applying them to particular policy fields 
and areas of legislation. The assessment of existing IA systems forms part of 
all reports of all monitored countries (however, progress reports for Iceland 
and Bosnia and Herzegovina refer to environmental impact assessments 
only). Thus, the 2012 progress report on Turkey notes the lack of progress in 
developing an IA system with a view of increasing the quality of legislation. 
The Commission was particularly concerned about the absence of an IA 
conducted prior to the adoption of some key legislation, e.g. the reform of the 
education system, and stated its concern about its significant costs and 
impact on quality (European Commission, 2012b p.12, 42). A clear condition 
for introducing environmental impact assessments in order to receive financial 
assistance was imposed back in 2004 (European Commission, 2004b, p. 24). 
One may also cite Croatia where the adoption, implementation and 
enforcement of IAs were closely monitored during the last pre-accession 
years (European Commission 2012c, p. 31). 
 
The countries that aspire to become EU member states, but do not dispose of 
a candidate or potential candidate status, or even an officially pronounced by 
                                                 
7
 Currently Iceland, Montenegro, Serbia, Turkey. 
8
 Currently Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
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the EU prospect of becoming an EU member, such as Moldova and Ukraine, 
also approximate their legislation with the EU, and are forerunners of this 
process in Eastern Europe. IA formed inherent part of the first EU-Ukraine 
Action Plan in 2005 requiring Ukraine to: “[a]dopt and implement a system of 
impact assessment of regulatory measures, consultation of stakeholders, and 
prior notification of regulatory changes to economic operators to ensure 
transparency (predictability of regulatory environment)” (European 
Commission, 2005b). The action plan also involved the adoption of a system 
for environmental impact assessments. Later, however, a general system of 
IA was excluded from the focus of action plans (later called association 
agendas), only environmental impact assessment being left as a requirement.  
 
3. The data 
  
 
Turning to data, main empirical findings derive from a IA-level database 
recording key characteristics of each individual text (for a full discussion of 
data collection see Lianos & Fazekas, 2013). The underlying data collection 
exercise estimates the total number of IAs produced between 2006 Q1 and 
2012 Q2 in 21 European countries9 at 26,308 IAs, or 179 IAs per year per 
country. This high average figure is due to a few highly active countries such 
as Estonia (4,681), or the UK (2,410). In some countries, no relevant IA 
activities could be identified during the examined period: Belgium (federal 
level); while in others data collection and coding could not be carried out: 
Austria, Portugal and Latvia. 
 
We applied a stratified random sampling with each year-country combination 
as a stratum which served our goal of analysing both variation across 
countries and within countries over time. In practice, a random sample was 
drawn from the identified full list of IAs per country per year. We coded at 
least 15 IAs per country per year10 (if there were fewer IAs produced by a 
given country in the given year our sample was smaller, of course) (Table 1). 
 
Table 1. Distribution of IAs according to year of publication and country, 
2006 Q1-2012 Q2 (non-weighted) 
country/year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012* Total 
BulgariaL 0 0 0 14 0 0 1 15 
Czech RepublicL 0 3 22 18 23 17 20 103 
Denmark 10 12 24 15 22 20 21 124 
EstoniaL 0 0 9 6 7 4 9 35 
EU Commission 76 88 114 77 51 119 32 557 
FranceL 0 0 0 3 14 9 2 28 
Germany 16 15 18 15 16 15 18 113 
GreeceL 0 0 0 0 10 14 46 70 
                                                 
9
 Compared to earlier publications data on one country, Lithuania, is not reported as it 
appears to have published 10 423 RIA which high figure requires further clarification. 
10
 Actual sample sizes may be smaller than this because of removing some IAs due to quality 
reasons;  work is in progress. 
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HungaryL 0 0 0 0 2 32 68 102 
Ireland 5 4 7 5 9 7 12 49 
Italy 13 44 16 23 20 9 1 126 
Netherlands 1 2 5 1 2 5 3 19 
Norway 11 9 12 7 10 10 10 69 
Poland 18 20 20 20 24 21 26 149 
RomaniaL 0 22 0 0 0 0 0 22 
SerbiaL 0 6 12 11 9 10 11 59 
Slovakia 8 13 11 13 11 13 2 71 
Slovenia 7 10 7 8 8 8 8 56 
SpainL 0 0 14 12 10 10 10 56 
Sweden 10 10 11 10 9 10 10 70 
UK 17 41 17 20 20 11 27 153 
Total 192 299 319 278 277 344 337 2046 
Source: Gutenberg project database 
Note: *=RIAs only from 2021Q1-Q2; L=laggard country (adopting in 2007 or 
later) 
 
The coding of each IA followed a pre-defined coding template of 125 variables 
organised around the following variable groups (full template in Lianos & 
Fazekas, 2013): 
 Background variables 
 Costs 
 Benefits 
 Comparison of costs and benefits 
 Evaluation of alternatives 
 Methodology-general 
 Methodology-discount rate and inflation 
 Presentation, structure 
 Consultation 
 Special topics-compliance/implementation  
 Specific topics-health impacts  
 Special topics-administrative burdens  
 Special topics-competition assessment  
 Special topics-environmental IA  
 Special topics-social impact assessment  
 Further specific topics  
 Referencing 
The coding was done manually by trained coders. All coded IAs were quality 
checked by a dedicated quality assurance team (for details see Lianos & 
Fazekas, 2013). 
Further empirical material was collected on the institutions pertaining to 
IA production and use. These institutional characteristics were identified by 
investigating official government documents and organisational structure.   
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4. Diffusion on the ground-a closer look at what diffusion really means 
in practice 
 
4.1 Diffusion of IA institutions 
 
IA institutions have spread across Europe, this trend translating into a 
quantitatively large IA activity (Figure 1). Interestingly, the average number of 
IAs produced in a year per country increased from 151 in 2006 to 277 in 2012 
which suggests that adopting IA institutions did result in using them. However, 
what is unclear from a macro-perspective is what kinds of IAs have European 
countries produced. 
 
Figure 1. Total number of countries adopting IA and total number of IAs 
produced across Europe, 2006Q1-2012Q2 
 
Source: Gutenberg project database 
*data only refer to the first half of 2012, so the figures are multiplied by two to 
arrive at a comparable estimate 
 
A first and probably most elementary aspect of the diffusion of IA institutions 
is the adoption of key institutional characteristics which could underpin IA 
production. Three such institutional characteristics deserve particular attention 
as they capture the aid to and control of IA quality and the prescribed IA 
quantity: 
 
1. Publication of a IA handbook whether an official methodological aid is 
published and valid in the given year in a country. 
2. IA-board-type body: whether an (semi-)independent central body is 
functional which is devoted to checking IA quality in the given year in a 
country. 
0
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0
5
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3. Mandatory IA for Parliamentary Bills: whether IA is mandatory for every 
bill introduced to the parliament by the government in the given year in 
a country. 
 
The diffusion of these key institutions supports a mixed view: on the one 
hand, more and more European countries adopt key IA institutions which are 
essential for running an effective IA system. On the other hand, there is a 
persistently wide gap between overall IA adoptions and the underlying quality 
of the IA institutional framework (Figure 22). 
 
Figure 2. Proportion of European countries adopting various basic IA 
institutions, 2006Q1-2012Q2, Ntotal=21 
 
Source: Gutenberg project database 
* data only refer to the first half of 2012 
 
4.2 Diffusion of different IA types  
Following Lianos and Fazekas (2014) 5 different IA types have been identified 
along 7 dimensions: 
 
 Scope of analysis: the number of impact areas which are touched 
upon; 
 Sophistication of analysis: the complexity and extensiveness of applied 
analytical methods; 
 Consultation: extensiveness of consultation as reported in the IA text; 
 Accountability: the degree the IA establishes accountability 
relationships between the law maker/regulator and the regulated; 
 Evaluating at least one alternative policy option; 
 Including a quantitative estimation of regulatory costs; and  
 Including a quantitative estimation of regulatory benefits. 
 
The identification of distinct IA types along these dimensions was carried out 
using advanced clustering techniques tightly integrated with theoretical 
0%
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80%
100%
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Publishing a RIA manual Mandatory RIA for legislation
RIA board-type bodies RIA adoptions
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considerations. These categories are predominantly descriptive while their 
significance lies in that they indicate different boundary arrangements 
between politics and expertise prevalent in each jurisdiction (Hoppe, 2005; 
2009). 
 
Table 2. Theoretically based and empirically identified IA types and their 
defining characteristics, Europe, 2006Q1-2012Q2 
 scope 
sophisticat
ion 
consu
lt-
ation 
accou
nt-
ability 
alt. 
policy 
optio
ns 
cost 
figur
es 
benef
it 
figur
es 
rudimenta
ry IA 
low low Low low no None none 
shallow 
CBA IA 
mediu
m 
low 
mediu
m/ low 
low no some some 
cost 
effectiven
ess IA 
low low 
mediu
m/ low 
mediu
m/ low 
no many none 
participat
ory IA  
mediu
m/ 
high 
low high high yes some some 
symbiotic 
IA 
high high high High yes many many 
Source: Gutenberg project database 
 
This multi-dimensional typology shows that well-developed IA systems may 
cater for diverse demands, most notably channelling societal demands 
through consultation into policy making and combining sophisticated scientific 
analysis with societal interests. However, shallow or symbolic IA systems 
have in common that they fail to reach any of these two distinct goals of IA as 
they both lack sufficient analytical complexity and extensive discussion of 
consultation in the text. By implication, rudimentary, shallow cost-benefit 
analysis, and cost-effectiveness type IAs indicate the implementation of 
shallow IA practices while participatory and symbiotic IAs indicate the 
implementation of well-developed IA practices.  
 
Decomposing IA production across Europe into these 5 distinct types reveals 
that most of the growth in IA activities is due to the increased number of 
shallow CBA, rudimentary, and symbiotic types (Figure 3). While cost 
effectiveness and participatory type IA numbers have been largely stable at 
least since 2008. These basic facts point towards a dynamically changing IA 
landscape where both shallow and well-developed IA practices increasingly 
spread across Europe. 
 
Figure 3. Total number of distinct IA types across Europe, 2006Q1-
2012Q2 
12 
 
 
Source: Gutenberg project database 
*data only refer to the first half of 2012, so the figures are multiplied by two to 
arrive at a comparable estimate 
 
Laggard or late adopter countries display a distinctively different distribution of 
IA types compared to non-laggard countries (Figure 4). They have a much 
higher proportion of rudimentary and shallow cost-benefit analysis type IAs 
and much lower proportion of the participatory type. This suggests that 
laggards are more readily implementing shallow practices.  
 
Figure 4. Distribution of IAs published in laggard and non-laggard 
countries according to IA types, Europe, 2006Q1-2012Q2Nnon-
laggard=13859, Nlaggard=3684 
 
Source: Gutenberg project database 
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However, the close to identical proportion of symbiotic and cost-effectiveness 
type IAs suggest that not every laggard is following a different path compared 
to non-laggards. Moreover, two late adopters have made it into the top 5 
European countries publishing symbiotic IAs: France and Czech Republic 
(Figure 5). 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Top 5 countries which publish symbiotic IA, Europe, 2006Q1-
2012Q2; N=3 817 
 
Source: Gutenberg project database 
 
 
The un-expected position of France and Czech Republic could follow from 
specific patterns of diffusion. Thus, a considerable innovation was introduced 
by France, where as of end of 2009 it has become the only European country 
to provide for a constitutional basis for impact assessment and an 
enforcement mechanism.11 Following the new system, if an impact 
assessment is not attached to a bill the Government sends to the Parliament, 
or if it is of poor quality, the conference of presidents of the parliamentary 
chamber may refuse to put the bill on the agenda. The principal reason that 
led to this constitutional amendment is the mobilisation of domestic 
administrative and political elites in favour of evaluation as a tool for improving 
the quality of legislation (Lasserre, 2004; Assemblée Nationale, 2009; Sénat, 
2009) and a broad consensus, across the political spectrum, in favour of this 
objective, with a constitutional anchorage of the practice, hinting to a possible 
joint operation of emulation through the voter information model, and the 
externalities pattern through competition for regulatory quality. 
 
                                                 
11
Article 8 of the la loi organique 2009403 du 15 avril 2009 relative à 
l’application des articles 341, 39 et 44 de la Constitution 
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The Czech success followed the reform that started in 2010 which by 2012 
resulted in a two-tier system, linking IA to the legislative planning stage. At the 
first stage, an obligatory preliminary IA is produced for all proposals when the 
annual Plan of Legislative Works of the Government is composed each year 
thus checking for the necessity to proceed to the second stage and conduct a 
full impact assessment. The IA Committee, which is an independent expert 
oversight body, has to be involved in the approval of this Plan of Legislative 
Tasks of the Government. All the draft bills that are introduced outside of the 
Plan have to have full IA by default. The strengthened institutional framework 
saw shifting of the IA unit from a line ministry to the Government Office under 
the direct supervision of the Deputy Prime Minister on Legislative process. In 
addition, since the beginning of 2012, the Czech IA Committee has been 
actively cooperating with German, Dutch, Swedish and British IA watchdogs, 
thus illustrating a parallel process of horizontal diffusion through a pattern of 
socialisation. 
  
These examples show that neither hypothesis can be fully refuted due to 
availability of both types of practices, however prevalence stays with H3. 
Although it is too risky, in view of the available evidence so far, to advance 
general hypothesis linking the depth of implementation of IA practices with the 
patterns of diffusion, it may be noted that for the two jurisdictions described 
above, the patterns of diffusion related to the emulation, externalities and 
socialisation models, which could contribute to their outlying positions within 
their group 
 
5. Conclusions  
  
Several patterns of diffusion may operate in parallel, thus rendering any effort 
to define a straightforward link between a specific pattern of diffusion and the 
emergence of a prevalent type of IA is particularly difficult, if not impossible. 
However there is a link between the process of diffusion and diffusion 
outcomes. Most late-comer European jurisdictions adopt and implement 
shallow and narrow IA practices with some notable exceptions such as 
France and the Czech Republic. Overall, the relative proportions of shallow 
and well-developed IA practices have remained the same, around 60-70% of 
published IAs belonging to the shallow type, with both practices growing at a 
similar rate (Figure 6). 
 
Figure 6. Combined number of RIAs grouped by shallow and well-
developed IA practice, Europe, 2006Q1-2012Q2 
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Source: Gutenberg project database 
*data only refer to the first half of 2012, so the figures are multiplied by two to 
arrive at a comparable estimate 
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